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VALUATION OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES FOR FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX PURPOSES
INTRODUCTION
In computing estate taxes, property in a decedent's estate is val-
ued at its fair market value on the applicable valuation date.' Fair
market value is defined by treasury regulation as "the price at which
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both
having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." 2 Where corporate
securities are involved, the regulations provide that the fair market
value is to be determined with reference to the prevailing prices in the
market where the securities are traded. If the securities are regularly
traded on a national or regional exchange, their market value is the
mean between the highest and lowest prices at which transactions in
the securities occurred on the valuation date.' If the securities are
traded only in the over-the-counter market, their market value is the
mean between the bona fide bid and asked prices on the valuation
date.' Because the market for mutual fund shares is unlike the market
1 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1958).
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958) provides:
Valuation of property in general. The value of every item of property in-
cludible in a decedent's gross estate under sections 2031 through 2044 is its fair
market value at the time of the decedent's death, except that if the executor
elects the alternate valuation method under section 2032, it is the fair market
value thereof at the date, and with the adjustments, prescribed in that section.
The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion
to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The
fair market value of a particular item of property includible in the decedent's
gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is the fair market
value of an item of property to be determined by the sale price of the item in a
market other than that in which such item is most commonly sold to the public,
taking into account the location of the item wherever appropriate. Thus, in the
case of an item of property includible in the decedent's gross estate, which is
generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of
such an item of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item
would be sold at retail. For example, the fair market value of an automobile
(an article generally obtained by the public in the retail market) includible in
the decedent's gross estate is the price for which an automobile of the same or
approximately the same description, make, model, age, condition, etc., could be
purchased by a member of the general public and not the price for which the
particular automobile of the decedent would be purchased by a dealer in used
automobiles. Examples of items of property which are generally sold to the
public at retail may be found in §§ 20.2031-6 and 20.2031-8. The value is gen-
erally to be determined by ascertaining as a basis the fair market value as of the
applicable valuation date of each unit of property.
3 Treas. Reg.	 20.2031-2(b) (1958).
4 Treas. Reg. I 20.2031-2(c) (1958). See also the discussion in text at note 13
infra.
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for other over-the-counter securities; the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued, in 1963, a specific regulation respecting the valuation
of fund shares.5
 The regulation provides that the fair market value of
mutual fund shares is the public offering, or asked, price of the shares.'
The validity of this regulation has been upheld by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Ruehlmann v. Commissioner,' and, during the
same year, by the Seventh Circuit in Howell v. United States.8 Recently,
however, the Second Circuit, in Cartwright v. United States," and the
Ninth Circuit, in Davis v. United States" affirmed federal district court
determinations that the regulation was invalid. With the grant of cer-
tiorari in Cartwright, the issue is now headed for ultimate resolution
by the Supreme Court.
This comment will consider the underlying factors which give rise
to the mutual fund valuation problem. Analysis will focus on the
method of valuation used by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the alternative method urged by taxpayers in the course of past
litigation. The comment concludes that while the current regulation's
use of the asked price requires the taxpayer to pay an estate tax based
upon a value which, as a practical matter, would have been impossible
for him to have realized through sale of his shares on the valuation
date, this fact is legally insufficient to warrant invalidation of the
applicable treasury regulation.
6 Prior to this time the Regulations did not specify standards for valuing mutual
funds. For many years such shares were reported at their bid prices, the toad charge not
being considered a part of their value. During the 1960's mutual fund shares came to be
treated as common stock, and therefore the mean between the bid and asked price was
taken to be the taxable value. The promulgation of a specific regulation in 1963 was,
some commentators believe, more an end to the Commissioner's indecision than a rejec-
tion of his previous policy of compromise. See, e.g., Note, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 256, 259-60
(1971).
6 Treas. Reg.	 20.2031-8(b) (1963), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 417, provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) Valuation of shares in an open-end investment company. (1) The fair market
value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly known as a
"mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share, adjusted for any reduction
in price available to the public in acquiring the number of shares being valued.
In the absence of an affirmative showing of the public offering price in effect
at the time of death, the last public offering price quoted by the company for the
date of death shall be presumed to be the applicable public offering price.
The regulation was issued as an interpretation of 4 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 which provides:
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.
7 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950, rehearing denied, 400
U.S. 856 (1970).
8 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969).
9 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972). As this comment went to press, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Cartwright case. 41 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
1-0 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
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I. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF MUTUAL FUNDS
Much of the problem of valuing mutual funds arises from essential
differences between the nature of and market for fund shares on the
one hand and, on the other, those of the common shares of other cor-
porate enterprises. For the typical business corporation, common
stock is the vehicle by which capital funds are channeled from the
investor to the corporation which will use the funds to produce a mar-
ketable product or service. After the initial issuance and sale of such
shares to the public, the shares are transferred in the securities markets
from one individual to another; the corporation is neither a party to
nor directly involved in the transactions." The market price of a com-
pany's shares is arrived at by an auction procedure in which buyers
and sellers negotiate, directly or through a broker, the price at which
each transaction will take place. The price of a particular security at
any given time generally reflects the collective judgment of investors
as to the present value of future dividends and expected appreciation
.in the price of the security, taking into consideration such factors as
the financial strength of the company, its history of sales, earnings and
dividends, its competitive position within its industry, and the quality
of its management. 12 Differences of opinion among investors as to
these factors or their relative importance lead some to purchase a
security while others are selling it. On any given day, the mean between
the highest and lowest prices at which transactions occur provides a
fair indication of the market value of a particular stock. If the shares
are not traded on a registered securities exchange, no record of daily
transactions is centrally maintained. However, the actual market value
may be assumed to lie somewhere between the highest quoted bid and
lowest price offered by those registered broker-dealers making a public
market in the stock as reported by the National Quotation Service."
The mean between these figures is acceptable as a fair approximation.
A mutual fund is a financial institution issuing its shares to the
public and investing the proceeds primarily in securities of other cor-
porations. Such funds are engaged in a continuous offering of their
shares through a continuous underwriting process, and stand ready to
issue as many shares as are necessary to meet the public demand."
Except for a negligible number of transfers, all transactions in a fund's
shares take place between the shareholder-investor and the fund itself;
although there are no legal restrictions on the transferability of these
11 While under certain circumstances a corporation may reacquire a number of its
own shares through market purchase or donation, such "treasury stock" accounts for a
very small fraction of all transactions in a company's shares.
12 See, e.g., B. Graham, D. Dodd, & S. Cottle, Security Analysis, pt. IV (1962). The
discussion in ch. 32 is especially helpful.
18 The "pink sheets," published by the National Quotation Service, supply daily
quotations for over-the-counter securities by all dealers currently making a public
market in each security.
14 It is because of this unlimited capitalization that mutual funds are unable to ob-
tain a listing on the major security exchanges.
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shares, they are ordinarily disposed of by redemption.' Section 22 of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires a mutual fund to
redeem, at current net asset value, all shares presented by shareholders
for redemption." The net asset value of a share is computed by adding
the market value of all securities and other assets owned by the fund,
subtracting the liabilities of the fund, and dividing the remainder by
the then total outstanding shares." The net asset value per share, or
redemption value, becomes the "bid" side of a price quotation for the
fund. The "asked" side, or public offering price, is arrived at by adding
to the net asset value a "load" or sales charge which is used to cover
the costs and expenses of marketing the shares." Although the loading
charge may vary among funds, the prevailing rate is 8.5 percent of the
total offering price including the load." Thus the bid and asked prices
in a mutual fund quotation do not delineate a range within which
negotiated transactions occur in an auction-like procedure, but rather
they are the specific prices at which all transactions in the fund on that
day will occur. All sales of shares by the fund to the public will take
place at the asked price; all sales by the public to the fund—redemp-
tions—will occur at the bid price. It is this dual pricing structure for
mutual funds that gives rise to the problem of legal valuation in the
estate tax context.
The typical fact pattern emerging from the relevant cases is quite
simple." Mutual fund shares held by the decedent at the time of death
are valued by his executor at the bid price on the estate tax return so
as to minimize the tax liability. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
values the shares at the asked price and assesses a deficiency. The
executor pays the deficiency and brings suit in federal district court
15 Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 872-73 (1968) ; Ruehlmann v.
Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302, 1303 (6th Cir. 1969). There is a small over-the-counter
resale market in mutual fund shares. This market is not widely known and has very
little or no effect on the general market. Mutual fund shares are bought by dealers in
this market at a price slightly above redemption value, but are resold by the dealers at
the public offering price. J. Clendenin, Introduction to Investments 398-99 (4th ed.
1964).
16 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1970).
17 See, e.g., Romanski, The Role of Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, 13
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 959 n.1 (1972).
18 The mutual fund receives no portion of the loading charge. It is divided between
the underwriter and the selling broker to cover their expenses and profit. Shares of some
mutual funds may be purchased at a public offering price equal to the net asset value
per share. There is no loading charge because these funds maintain no dealer organization
or staff of sales representatives. Investors are not solicited but must apply directly to the
underwriter. Such funds, however, account for only a small fraction of mutual fund
industry assets and shareholder accounts. Securities and Exchange Commission, Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 204 (1966).
16 Romanski, The Role of Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, 13 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 959, 966 n. 41 (1972).
20 See Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Cartwright v.
United States, 457 F.2d 567, 568 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45,
46 (7th Cir. 1969).
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for a refund. In the course of litigation, each party attempts to con-
vince the court of the appropriateness of various analogies upon which
they rely. None of the problems represented by these analogies is pre-
cisely like the valuation of mutual fund shares, and all are sufficiently
different to give rise to serious disagreement among learned members
of the bench and bar. It is through consideration of the offered anal-
ogies, and of some additional standards of value, that one can best
understand the various aspects of the controversy over mutual fund
valuation.
II. THE WILLING BUYER-WILLING SELLER TEST21
The application of the willing buyer-willing seller test has been at
issue in each of the mutual fund valuation cases. The Howell and
Ruehlmann courts, upholding valuation by the Commissioner at the
asked price, have argued that the statutory duty of the fund to repur-
chase shares prevents the fund from ever being a willing buyer."
Accordingly, these courts reason, only the original sale of the shares
to a public purchaser constitutes a willing buyer-willing seller trans-
action." Since this transaction takes place at the public offering or
asked price, the shares are properly valued at that price.
The Davis and Cartwright courts, holding valuation by the Com-
missioner at the asked price to be improper, have taken a different view
of the application of the willing buyer-willing seller test." The existence
of a willing buyer and a willing seller, they point out, ordinarily results
in a single price. Once the willing buyer and willing seller have agreed,
the price is the same for both. In the case of mutual funds, however,
there are two prices. Transactions entered into by a willing public pur-
chaser and a willing public seller, each dealing directly with the fund
at the same moment, take place at different prices. Hence the test is
inappropriate to the determination of fair market value in the mutual
fund context.
Still other courts have used the willing buyer-willing seller test
to argue in favor of valuation at the bid price. For example, in Hicks
v. United States25
 the court notes that there are not two separate
markets for mutual fund shares; rather, a sale by the fund in the
original issue market includes an agreement to repurchase at the re-
demption price, which the parties agree will be set with reference to a
fixed standard—the net asset value of the shares. Because the fund
was not compelled to sell in the first place, but did so with knowledge
21 See text at note 2 supra.
22 414 F.2d at 45; 418 F.2d at 1304.
28 Estate
 of Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 876; Howell v. United States, 414
F.2d at 48; Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d at 1304.
24 Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d at 771; Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d
567, 570-571 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Note, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 256, 264 (1971); Note,
Valuation of Shares in Open-End Investment Companies for Federal Estate Tax Pur-
poses Held to be Replacement Cost, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 416 (1969).
25 335 F. Supp. 474 (D. Colo. 1971).
138
VALUATION OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES
of its subsequent duty to repurchase, it may be viewed as a willing
buyer at the time of such repurchase." It is this net asset value stan-
dard, then, that should be used to value the mutual fund shares: "The
touchstone of fair market value has always been the price which a
willing seller could reasonably be expected to obtain from a disposition
of the property in miestion." 27
In the light of these contradictory arguments, each possessing
some degree of validity, it appears that the willing buyer-willing seller
test does not hold a definitive answer to the mutual fund valuation
problem. As one commentator has observed, "the classic definition of
fair market value, although conceptually appealing, tends to elicit a
nebulous array of theoretical arguments, while failing to solve the
majority of valuation problems.""
III. SINGLE PREMIUM LIFE INSURANCE POLICY ANALOGY
The principal analogy utilized by the Commissioner" has been a
comparison of mutual funds to single premium life insurance policies.
The initial purchase price of such a policy—cost—is always in excess
of the price at which the policy may be immediately redeemed—cash
surrender value. As time elapses after the initial purchase, the cash
surrender value will grow and eventually exceed the original cost of
the policy, but it will never become as great as the cost of duplicating
the policy at that point in time—replacement cost. The relationship
between the cost of such a policy and its cash surrender value is said
to be analogous to the relationship between the asked and bid quota-
tions for a mutual fund share.
The leading case of Guggenheim v. Rasquinn declares the law
with respect to the valuation of single premium life insurance policies
in the context of a federal gift tax return. Provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code relating to gift taxes are generally construed to be in
pari materia with those relating to estate taxes.' In Guggenheim, the
United States Supreme Court held the value of single premium life
insurance policies to be their replacement cost. All of the economic
benefits of a policy must be taken into consideration, reasoned the
Court, in determining its value." The holder of a fully paid life insur-
ance policy has the right to surrender it or to retain it for its investment
value and to collect the face amount upon the death of the insured.
26 Accord, Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. at 772. See also discussion in
Note, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 256, 260-61 (1971).
27 Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 878 (dissenting opinion).
28 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 24, at 442.
29 Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972); Cartwright v. United
States, 457 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1972); Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th
Cir. 1969).
89 .312 U.S. 254 (1941).
81 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308,
313 (1945); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
82 312 U.S. at 257.
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Only the replacement cost can properly reflect the value to the owner
of this entire bundle of rights in a single premium policy." Liquidation
value is not an appropriate measure because it assumes destruction of
these important features, which may be valued in terms of the differ-
ence between the cash surrender value and the replacement cost.
The mutual fund shareholder, the Commissioner has argued,
acquires rights and benefits of a similar nature. The purchaser acquires
the right to share in future dividends and capital gains distributions
and obtains diversification of his investment portfolio and professional'
investment management. The value of these rights to the shareholder
may be measured by the amount of money above the liquidation value
—that is, above the bid price—that he is initially willing to pay to
acquire those rights. This amount is equal to the sales load and is
included only in the asked price. At least two courts have found this
analogy sufficiently persuasive to make valuation of mutual funds at
the asked price reasonable and permissible.a 4 The rationale appears to
be that when the price which individuals are willing to pay in order to
acquire an asset is in excess of the asset's liquidation value in the hands
of the public, the asset must possess an element of value in addition to
its liquidation value which, in the opinion of the purchasers, justifies
the difference between that value and the cost of acquisition.
A different court found that the Commissioner's attempt to remold
the facts and law of Guggenheim to fit the mutual fund valuation
problem was unrealistic and unreasonable." Other courts, in sympathy
with this view, reasoned that there were essential differences between
single premium policies and mutual funds that rendered the analogy
useless." First, the value of the life insurance policy is rooted in the
eventual collection of the face amount." Thus the value of the policy
at any given time depends primarily upon the age and health of the
insured. Advancing age or intervening illness may decrease or eliminate
the chance of obtaining another policy and will of course increase the
cost of such a policy. As one approaches the hypothetical point of
uninsurability, then, the right to retain an existing policy grows in value.
Any computation of the real value of such a policy is at best imprecise,
and, under these circumstances, valuation at replacement cost may be
justified." In contrast, computing the net asset value of a mutual fund
share on any given day involves no such uncertainty. That value may
be computed exactly, and there is no additional value in the right of
retention itself.
88 Id.
84 Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Ruehlmann v. Cora-
miss' loner, 418 F.2d 1302, 1304 (6th Cir. 1969). See also the district court opinion in
Howell, 290 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
86 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
80 Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
87 Id. See also 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 24, at 419.
88 Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. at 258; cf. Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418
F.2d at 1304.
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A second difference is that an insurance policy may be readily
disposed of by assignment at a negotiated price in the ordinary
course of business, but a mutual fund share is usually redeemed by
the fund. Third, although a mutual fund purchaser acquires with his
share the right to future dividends and possible capital gains, this is
no more than is acquired by the purchaser of any corporate security.
In both cases, the amount paid for the shares above liquidation value
is for expenses of advertising and marketing only and adds nothing to
the value of the share itself." The Commissioner has never argued for
the inclusion of brokerage fees in valuing other securities, and to do so
for mutual funds, said the Davis court, would impose an estate tax
penalty for investing in mutual funds rather than in some equivalent
security."
Weighing the arguments in regard to this analogy, it appears that
the precedential value for mutual fund valuation cases of the Supreme
Court's decision with respect to single premium life insurance policy
valuation is, at best, questionable.
IV. THE INCLUSION OF ACQUISITION COSTS IN
FAIR MARKET VALUE
A. Excise Tax on Jewelry Analogy
Another analogy, offered by the Commissioner in Howell, com-
pares the excise tax levied on jewelry at the time of purchase with the
sales load which comprises the difference between the bid and asked
price for mutual fund shares:" The excise tax is, in general, a levy on
certain consumer items, calculated as a fixed percentage of the purchase
price.42 In Estate of Gould v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court consid-
ered whether such an excise tax ought to be included in valuing jewelry
for gift tax purposes. As noted above, the Code provisions relating to
estate and gift taxes are to be similarly construed:" in Gould, the
taxpayer bought a ring which he then gave as a gift to his wife. The
retail price of the ring was $58,000 and the federal excise tax amounted
to $5,800, making a total purchase price of $63,800. On his gift tax
return, the taxpayer valued the ring at $58,000. The Commissioner
determined the fair market value of the ring to be $63,800, and assessed
a deficiency. The taxpayer paid the tax and sued for a refund. He
argued that a person or estate could realize only $58,000 if it sold the
ring, since no tax would be imposed on the resale. The Commissioner
no Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 880 (dissenting opinion); Cartwright
v. United States, 457 F.2d at 571.
40 306 F. Supp. at 949.
41 Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 876-877 (1968). See also Howell v.
United States, 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969).
42
 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 2400. This tax was subsequently repealed, Act of June
21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 101(a), 79 Stat. 136.
43 14 T.C. 414 (1950). See also Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952).
44 See note 31 supra.
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answered that the very existence of a tax on all new rings sold by
dealers would increase the second-hand price to something between
$58,000 and $63,800. The court held that since there was no acceptable
market in which such a ring could normally be disposed of by a tax-
payer and no evidence of what price might have been realized upon a
sale, alternative means of valuation could properly be considered. The
court then held that the value of the ring must include the excise tax,
since the donee would have had to pay the tax had she purchased a
similar ring herself."
In the mutual fund cases, the Commissioner has pressed the anal-
ogy on the basis that the total purchase price of the jewelry is equiva-
lent to the asked price for a mutual fund share, while the resale price
of the jewelry free of the excise tax is equivalent to the bid or redemp-
tion price of the shares. At least one taxpayer sought to discredit the
analogy on the ground that the cases following Gould are all limited
to situations where no other probative evidence of fair market value
exists." In such cases, it may be argued, valuation at the purchase
price is reasonable; but since there is other evidence of fair market
value in the mutual fund situation, cases involving mutual fund share
value are distinguishable from the jewelry cases. It is submitted, how-
ever, that such a restricted reading of the jewelry cases is not manda-
tory, and that the cases may be properly used to support the general
proposition that acquisition costs are includible in estate tax property
valuation 47
B. Analogy to Other Corporate Securities
Taxpayers in the mutual fund cases have responded to the argu-
ment favoring inclusion of acquisition costs with an analogy of their own.
In Howell, the taxpayer asserted that the sales load which represents
the difference between the bid and asked price for mutual fund shares
is of precisely the same nature as the commission and fees associated
with the purchase of a listed security." The Commissioner, he argued,
45 14 T.C. at 417. The court mentioned but did not deal extensively with the
related argument that if the donor had chosen to give a cash gift to the donee for the
purpose of purchasing a ring, he would have given an amount equal to the purchase price
of the ring including the tax. This argument is self-serving, for if the donee chooses to
give the ring to another, the value must be determined by an alternative means, there
being no thought or possibility of a cash alternative.
46 Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
924 (1954). The court held that where there existed an irreconcilable conflict in evi-
dence regarding valuation of a large diamond in a limited dealers' market and the price
which the diamond would bring at retail, the cost of an item may be considered as the
best evidence of value. See also Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
47 See, e.g., 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev., supra note 24, which, although generally supportive of
the taxpayer's position, points out that "these cases [including Gould] would seem to sup-
port the ... position for the inclusion of acquisition costs in estate tax valuation." Id. at
420.
48 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969).
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has never sought to include these fees in the valuation of such secu-
rities in spite of the fact that they are part of the replacement or acqui-
sition cost of such securities.
The Howell court responded that since the bid and asked prices
on listed stocks are identical, the willing buyer-willing seller test may
be applied and there is no necessity to resort to replacement or acquisi-
tion cost as a standard. This answer, however, appears overly simple,
for it ignores the compromise valuation required by regulation with
respect to over-the-counter securities and the exclusion of brokerage
fees in the valuation of such securities. It is submitted that there is a
better answer that the court overlooked. First, in the case of other
corporate securities, even over-the-counter securities, the brokerage
fees do not reflect the difference between the current bid and asked
prices but represent an additional charge above the asked price. In
addition, such brokerage fees are not commonly included in the quota-
tion of a corporate stock and are not generally considered to be part
of the price at which the stock is trading, whereas with a mutual fund
such fees are part of the price quotation and in fact comprise the
difference between the bid and asked quotation.
Thus there are some important distinctions between the acquisi-
tion costs associated with mutual fund shares and those associated
with other securities which appear to destroy the effectiveness of the
Howell taxpayer's analogy. The cases holding that the excise tax should
be included in the valuation of jewelry provide a considerably more
persuasive analogy. However, they constitute the only authority for the
proposition that acquisition costs borne by the purchaser must be in-
cluded in determining value at a later time."
V. RESTRICTED STOCK ANALOGY
Another analogy used by the taxpayers in the mutual fund cases
views the purchase of mutual fund shares as essentially similar to the
purchase of any corporate securities subject to restrictive agreements
regarding resale." The treasury regulation applicable to valuation of
such restricted stock51 applies to situations in which such shares are
subject to a binding contractual agreement that they may not be sold
to the general public without first being offered to a specified party
at a certain price. If the restriction is the product of an arm's length
transaction, then the price specified in the agreement is the maximum
40 A distinction might be made between those acquisition costs which are clearly
separable from the underlying price and those which are inseparably a part of the retail
price. In the former category are brokerage commissions, bank charges for setting up a
trust, and title insurance on real estate ; in the latter are such things as the underwriting
commission on a new stock issue, and the salesman's commission on a new automobile or
other consumer good.
do See, e.g., Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, SO T.C. at 878 (dissenting opinion),
cited in Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d at 571.
di Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
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at which the shares may be valued for estate tax purposes. 52 The
Davis court found the rationale of this regulation applicable to mutual
fund share transactions because, realistically, the fund is the only
buyer for the taxpayer's shares, and the redemption price represents
the only value which can be obtained for the shares."
There appear to be several reasons for finding this analogy invalid.
First, the mutual fund situation does not involve an option by the fund
to purchase the shares. On the contrary, redemption is at the option of
the shareholder. Second, in the case of the mutual fund there is no
definite price mutually agreed upon by the parties; rather, there is
only a standard—net asset value—with respect to which the price will
be set." Third, there is no legal restriction upon the right of the mutual
fund shareholder to transfer his shares to another individual without
offering them to the fund, and to do so at a price above the redemption
price offered by the fund." While such a buyer would no doubt be
difficult to locate, there is nothing to prevent a would-be seller of fund
shares from taking whatever steps he might to seek out a buyer other
than the fund. If such a buyer could be found, he would probably be
willing to pay something above the bid price of the shares but less than
the asked price as quoted by the fund.5° The infirmities of the restricted
stock analogy are thus numerous and apparent.
VI. ARGUMENT FOR REALIZABLE VALUE
When their analogies failed, taxpayers in Howell and Cartwright
fell back on the argument that the bid price is the only fair and proper
measure of valuation." Property held by an estate should not be valued
52
 Where another person bolds an option or a contract to purchase securities owned
by a decedent at the time of his death, the effect that is given to the option or contract
price in determining the value of the securities for estate tax purposes depends upon
the circumstances of the particular case. Little weight will be accorded a price contained
in an option or contract under which the decedent is free to dispose of the underlying
securities at any price he chooses during his lifetime. Such would be the effect, for
example, of an agreement on the part of a shareholder to purchase whatever shares of
stock the decedent may own at the time of his death. Even if the decedent is not free
to dispose of the underlying securities at other than the option or contract price, such
price will be disregarded in determining the value of the securities unless it is deter-
mined under the circumstances of the particular case that the agreement represents a
bona fide business arrangement and not a device to pass the decedent's shares to the
natural objects of his bounty for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth. Rev. Bull. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237; see 2 Casner, Estate Planning
945-951 (1961 ed.).
68
 306 F. Supp. at 955.
54
 See text at notes 16-17 supra.
88 See text at note 15 supra. See also Note, Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares for
Federal Estate Tax Purposes, 22 Baylor L. Rev. 348, 356 (1970).
86 Compare the argument of the Commissioner in Gould, discussed at notes 43-45
supra, that the resale price of a ring subject to excise tax when originally purchased lies
somewhere between the price including the excise tax and the price free of the tax.
T Howell v. United States, 290 F. Supp. at 692; Cartwright v. United States, 457
F.2d at 570-572.
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at an amount greater than that for which the property could be sold by
the estate in the only readily accessible market in the ordinary course
of business." However, since the mutual fund shares in question will
not be liquidated and since the estate tax is intended to be a tax on
value transferred at death," the question arises whether the value
transferred can be viewed as greater than the liquidation value at the
time of transfer. The answer to this appears to depend essentially upon
the personal preference of the transferee. If the transferee is not inter-
ested in retaining the mutual fund shares but intends immediately to
liquidate them for cash, or instructs the executor to do so prior to dis-
tribution, the value he receives is limited in a real sense to the bid price.
The right to retain the shares is worth nothing to him. If, however,
the transferee desires to own the fund shares and would even have
used a bequest of cash to purchase such shares, the argument that he
receives property properly valued at the asked price is strong. The
Cartwright court stated that the widely accepted principle of valuation
embodied in the applicable treasury regulation is that "all relevant
facts and elements of value as of the applicable application date shall
be considered in every case."" However, there are no grounds for
assuming that the Treasury or indeed the courts would accept an
argument for a taxation standard based upon the transferee's personal
preference: there must be a known standard of value for mutual fund
shares common to all holders.
The Code declares that the value of a decedent's gross estate will
be the value of all property "to the extent of the interest therein of the
decedent."" The Davis court found in this regard that the decedent
acquires no interest in that portion of the purchase price of a fund
share which represents the sales load. 02 The shareholder cannot realize
this amount, said the court, nor can he make a transfer so that his
transferee may realize it. The fund receives only the net asset value,
and the remainder of the purchase price is used for commissions to sales
representatives and other expenses incidental to the distribution and
sale of mutual fund shares. To apply an estate tax on the sales load is
to tax a non-existent "interest" of the decedent.°
In opposition to this view it has been argued that the transforma-
tion of a cash asset into a less liquid form should not markedly affect
the taxable value of the non-cash asset." These arguments bring us no
closer to a common agreement. While some courts viewing them have
58 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. at 772; Davis v. United States, 306 F.
Supp. at 955. See also Note, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 256, 263 (1971).
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001.
88 Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d at 571. The court is citing Treas. Reg.
20.2031-1(b).
01 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033.
82 460 F.2d at 771.
a Id. at 772; accord, Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo. 1971).
04 Note, Internal Revenue—Gift Taxation—VaIuation of Mutual Fund Shares, 20
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 917, 924 & n.22 (1969).
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found that logic permits no conclusion other than that the regulation
is unreasonable," others have heard the same arguments and found
the regulation to be manifestly reasonable and appropriate." After all
the arguments and analogies have been heard, the legal question
is in fact reduced to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the regula-
tion in question.
VII. CONCLUSION: ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AND
THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
• Perhaps the most important factor to consider in evaluating the
decisions relating to mutual fund valuation for estate tax purposes is
that the courts have not been completely free to listen to all the sug-
gested alternative bases of valuation and their supporting arguments
and analogies, and then choose the best alternative. They have been
constrained to reach a decision in the context of an existing treasury
regulation which already prescribed a particular method of valuation.
It is submitted that the pre-existence of this treasury regulation in fact
presents the strongest argument for its retention. Regulations issued
in interpretation of a particular federal statute by the administrative
agency charged with enforcement of the statute are accorded special
judicial respect.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that if a challenged
regulation is reasonable and consistent with the statute under which
it is promulgated, it must be sustained." If several methods of valua-
tion are permissible and one of these is chosen by the Commissioner,
it may not be set aside." The role of a court in such a case is merely to
insure that the Commissioner is within his authority and has acted
in a reasonable manner. Beyond that, the court is not at liberty to
"second guess" the Commissioner."
In ruling on the validity of a treasury regulation in United States
v. Correll," the Supreme Court said:
Alternatives to the Commissioner's .. . rule are of course
available. Improvements might be imagined. But we do not
sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of
the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner,
not to the courts, the task of prescribing "all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue
Code. In this area of limitless factual variations "it is the
65 See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo. 1971).
66
 Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Ruehlmann v. Commis-
sioner, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969).
87 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
68 Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d at 48, citing DuPont's Estate v. Commissioner,
233 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956) ; Mearkle's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942).
69 Ruch'mann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d at 1304.
70 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
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province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the courts,
to make the appropriate adjustments. The role of the judiciary
in cases of this sort begins and ends with assuring that the
Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to imple-
ment the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner."7 '
A heavy burden is on the taxpayer who would rebut such a judicial
presumption of validity. He must not only present an alternative which
is better than that chosen by the Commissioner, but must also prove
the existing regulation to be unreasonable and intolerable in the con-
text of the statute under which it was promulgated. It is submitted
that, in order to be "reasonable," a regulation must meet only minimum
standards of acceptibility, appropriateness, fairness and suitability. It
must not be arbitrary and must have some rational basis in the
statute. In short—if one may make value judgments about tax regula-
tions—it need not be a "good" regulation. It is submitted that the
regulation in controversy here is not good but that it is reasonable.
WILLIAM A. BIBBO
71 Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
147
